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Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate 
Daniel J. Solove† 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the horrific images of September 11 were seared into 
the public consciousness, the longstanding clash between security and 
liberty has been at the forefront of law and politics. Generally, law 
enforcement is primarily investigative, focusing on apprehending per-
petrators of past crimes. When it comes to terrorism, law enforcement 
shifts to being more preventative, seeking to identify terrorists before 
they act. To this end, the government has become interested in data 
mining—a new technological tool to pinpoint the terrorists burrowed 
in among us. Data mining involves creating profiles by collecting and 
combining personal data, and analyzing it for particular patterns of 
behavior deemed to be suspicious.1 In this way, data mining helps pre-
dict who might be likely to conduct a future terrorist attack.  
In 2002, the Department of Defense, under the guidance of Ad-
miral John Poindexter, began developing a data mining project called 
Total Information Awareness (TIA). Under the TIA program, the 
government would assemble a massive database consisting of finan-
cial, educational, health, and other information on US citizens, which 
would later be analyzed to single out people matching a terrorist pro-
file. According to Poindexter, “[t]he only way to detect [ ] terrorists is 
to look for patterns of activity that are based on observations from 
past terrorist attacks as well as estimates about how terrorists will 
adapt to our measures to avoid detection.”2 The program sparked 
public outrage, and the Senate denied it funding. But TIA did not die; 
instead, it exists in various projects with obscure names such as Bas-
ketball, Genoa II, and Topsail. Unlike TIA, which had its own website, 
these projects are significantly more clandestine.3  
 
 † Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. Thanks to Chris Hoof-
nagle, Paul Schwartz, Michael Sullivan, and Tal Zarsky for helpful suggestions, and to Sheerin 
Shahinpoor for research assistance. This essay is © Daniel J. Solove.  
 1 See Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, Report, Safeguarding Privacy in the 
Fight against Terrorism (“TAPAC Report”) 2–5 (Mar 1, 2004), online at http://www.cdt.org/ 
security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (discussing the Department of De-
fense’s and other government agencies’ use of data mining as a means of intelligence gathering). 
 2 John M. Poindexter, Finding the Face of Terror in Data, NY Times A25 (Sept 10, 2003). 
 3 Shane Harris, TIA Lives On, Natl J 66, 66–67 (Feb 25, 2006). 
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The government has also been developing other data mining pro-
grams. The Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee (TAPAC), 
tasked with examining government data mining, noted that “TIA was 
not the tip of the iceberg, but rather one small specimen in a sea of 
icebergs.”4 Following September 11, the Transportation Security Ad-
ministration (TSA), with the help of the FBI, has been developing a 
program to mine data about airline passengers to determine who 
should be allowed to fly, selected for extra screening, or denied the 
right to board an aircraft.5 In May 2006, the media revealed that the 
National Security Administration (NSA) had gathered a massive 
amount of telephone customer records to create the “largest database 
ever assembled in the world.”6 Various states have used the Multi-
state Anti-terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX), a shared da-
tabase of personal information subject to data mining analysis.7 
Countless other data mining programs are being used or developed—
about 200 according to one government report in 2004.8  
                                                                                                                          
Data mining is one issue in a larger debate about security and 
privacy. Proponents of data mining justify it as an essential tool to pro-
tect our security. For example, Judge Richard Posner argues that “[i]n 
an era of global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, the government has a compelling need to gather, pool, sift, 
and search vast quantities of information, much of it personal.”9 
Moreover, proponents of security measures argue that we must pro-
vide the executive branch with the discretion it needs to protect us. We 
cannot second guess every decision made by government officials, and 
excessive meddling into issues of national security by judges and oth-
 
 4 TAPAC Report at 5 (cited in note 1).  
 5 See Daniel J. Solove, Marc Rotenberg, and Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy Law 
603–04 (Aspen 2d ed 2006). Several successive versions of the screening program have been 
developed and abandoned. For example, after September 11, the government sought to develop 
the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II)—a successor to the 
screening program in place before September 11. CAPPS II was abandoned because it grew too far 
beyond its original purpose; it was later replaced with a program called Secure Flight. This was later 
abandoned as well. The TSA continues to develop passenger screening data mining systems.  
 6 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls; 3 Telecoms Help 
Government Collect Billions of Domestic Records, USA Today 1A (May 11, 2006) (quotation 
marks omitted). But see Susan Page, Lawmakers: NSA Database Incomplete; Some Who Were 
Briefed about the Database Identify Who Participated and Who Didn’t, USA Today 2A (June 30, 
2006) (explaining that the database of domestic phone call records is incomplete because certain 
telecommunications providers did not provide the NSA with call records).  
 7 For more details on the MATRIX program, see Jacqueline Klosek, The War on Privacy 
51–53 (Praeger 2007); GAO, Data Mining: Federal Efforts Cover a Wide Range of Uses, GAO-04-548, 
5 (May 2004), online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
 8 GAO, Data Mining at 2 (cited in note 7). 
 9 Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency 
141 (Oxford 2006).  
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ers lacking expertise will prove detrimental. For example, William 
Stuntz contends that “effective, active government—government that 
innovates, that protects people who need protecting, that acts aggres-
sively when action is needed—is dying. Privacy and transparency are 
the diseases. We need to find a vaccine, and soon.”10 Stuntz concludes 
that “[i]n an age of terrorism, privacy rules are not simply unafford-
able. They are perverse.”11  
We live in an “age of balancing,” and the prevailing view is that 
most rights and civil liberties are not absolute.12 Thus, liberty must be 
balanced against security. But there are systematic problems with how 
the balancing occurs that inflate the importance of the security inter-
ests and diminish the value of the liberty interests. In this essay, I ex-
amine some common difficulties in the way that liberty is balanced 
against security in the context of data mining. Countless discussions 
about the tradeoffs between security and liberty begin by taking a 
security proposal and then weighing it against what it would cost our 
civil liberties. Often, the liberty interests are cast as individual rights 
and balanced against the security interests, which are cast in terms of 
the safety of society as a whole. Courts and commentators defer to the 
government’s assertions about the effectiveness of the security inter-
est. In the context of data mining, the liberty interest is limited by nar-
row understandings of privacy that neglect to account for many pri-
vacy problems. As a result, the balancing concludes with a victory in 
favor of the security interest. But as I will argue, important dimensions 
of data mining’s security benefits require more scrutiny, and the pri-
vacy concerns are significantly greater than currently acknowledged. 
These problems have undermined the balancing process and skewed 
the results toward the security side of the scale.  
I.  THE SECURITY INTEREST 
Debates about data mining begin with the assumption that it is an 
essential tool in protecting our security. Terrorists lurk among us, and 
ferreting them out can be quite difficult. Examining data for patterns 
will greatly assist in this endeavor, the argument goes, because certain 
identifiable characteristics and behaviors are likely to be associated 
with terrorist activity. Often, little more is said, and the debate pro-
                                                                                                                           
 10 William J. Stuntz, Secret Service: Against Privacy and Transparency, New Republic 12, 12 
(Apr 17, 2006).  
 11 Id at 14. 
 12 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L J 943, 
965–72 (1987) (analyzing the evolution and acceptance of the balancing of interests in a wide 
array of different constitutional issues and discussing some of the problems that have since arisen).  
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ceeds to examine whether privacy is important enough to refrain from 
using such an effective terrorism-fighting tool.  
Many discussions about security and liberty proceed in this fash-
ion. They commence by assuming that a particular security measure is 
effective, and the only remaining question is whether the liberty inter-
est is strong enough to curtail that measure. But given the gravity of 
the security concerns over terrorism, the liberty interest has all but 
lost before it is even placed on the scale.  
A. The Deference Argument 
Judge Richard Posner argues that judges should give the execu-
tive branch considerable deference when it comes to assessing the 
security measures it proposes. In his recent book, Not a Suicide Pact: 
The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency,13 Posner contends 
that judicial restraint is wise because “when in doubt about the actual 
or likely consequences of a measure, the pragmatic, empiricist judge 
will be inclined to give the other branches of government their 
head.”14 According to Posner, “[j]udges aren’t supposed to know much 
about national security.”15 Likewise, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
declare in their new book, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and 
the Courts,16 that “the executive branch, not Congress or the judicial 
branch, should make the tradeoff between security and liberty.”17 
Moreover, Posner and Vermeule declare that during emergencies, 
“[c]onstitutional rights should be relaxed so that the executive can 
move forcefully against the threat.”18 
The problem with such deference is that, historically, the execu-
tive branch has not always made the wisest national security decisions. 
Nonetheless, Posner and Vermeule contend that notwithstanding its 
mistakes, the executive branch is better than the judicial and legisla-
tive branches on institutional competence grounds.19 “Judges are gener-
alists,” they observe, “and the political insulation that protects them 
from current politics also deprives them of information, especially in-
formation about novel security threats and necessary responses to those 
threats.”20 Posner and Vermeule argue that during emergencies, the 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency 
(Oxford 2006). 
 14 Id at 27. 
 15 Id at 37. 
 16 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the 
Courts (Oxford 2007). 
 17 Id at 5. 
 18 Id at 16. 
 19 See id at 6.  
 20 Id at 31.  
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“novelty of the threats and of the necessary responses makes judicial 
routines and evolved legal rules seem inapposite, even obstructive.”21  
“Judicial routines” and “legal rules,” however, are the cornerstone 
of due process and the rule of law—the central building blocks of a 
free and democratic society. At many times, Posner, Vermeule, and 
other strong proponents of security seem to focus almost exclusively 
on what would be best for security when the objective should be es-
tablishing an optimal balance between security and liberty. Although 
such a balance may not promote security with maximum efficiency, it 
is one of the costs of living in a constitutional democracy as opposed 
to an authoritarian political regime. The executive branch may be the 
appropriate branch for developing security measures, but this does not 
mean that it is the most adept branch at establishing a balance be-
tween security and liberty.  
In our constitutional democracy, all branches have a role to play 
in making policy. Courts protect constitutional rights not as absolute 
restrictions on executive and legislative policymaking but as important 
interests to be balanced against government interests. As T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff notes, “balancing now dominates major areas of constitu-
tional law.”22 Balancing occurs through various forms of judicial scru-
tiny, requiring courts to analyze the weight of the government’s interest, 
a particular measure’s effectiveness in protecting that interest, and the 
extent to which the government interest can be achieved without un-
duly infringing upon constitutional rights.23 For balancing to be mean-
ingful, courts must scrutinize both the security and liberty interests.  
With deference, however, courts fail to give adequate scrutiny to 
security interests. For example, after the subway bombings in London, 
the New York Police Department began a program of random 
searches of people’s baggage on the subway. The searches were con-
ducted without a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspi-
cion. In MacWade v Kelly,24 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit upheld the program against a Fourth Amendment 
challenge. Under the special needs doctrine, when exceptional circum-
stances make the warrant and probable cause requirements unneces-
sary, the search is analyzed in terms of whether it is “reasonable.”25 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Id at 18. 
 22 Aleinikoff, 96 Yale L J at 965 (cited in note 12).  
 23 See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of 
Rights, 84 Iowa L Rev 941, 954–55 (1999). 
 24 460 F3d 260 (2d Cir 2006).  
 25 Id at 267–68.  
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Reasonableness is determined by balancing the government interest 
in security against the interests in privacy and civil liberties.26  
The weight of the security interest should turn on the extent to 
which the program effectively improves subway safety. The goals of 
the program may be quite laudable, but nobody questions the impor-
tance of subway safety. The critical issue is whether the search pro-
gram is a sufficiently effective way of achieving those goals that it is 
worth the tradeoff in civil liberties. On this question, unfortunately, the 
court deferred to the law enforcement officials, stating that the issue 
“is best left to those with a unique understanding of, and responsibility 
for, limited public resources, including a finite number of police offi-
cers.”27 In determining whether the program was “a reasonably effec-
tive means of addressing the government interest in deterring and 
detecting a terrorist attack on the subway system,”28 the court refused 
to examine the data to assess the program’s effectiveness.29  
The way the court analyzed the government’s side of the balance 
would justify nearly any search, no matter how ineffective. Although 
courts should not take a know-it-all attitude, they should not defer on 
such a critical question as a security measure’s effectiveness. The prob-
lem with many security measures is that they are not wise expendi-
tures of resources. A small number of random searches in a subway 
system of over four million riders a day seems more symbolic than 
effective because the odds of the police finding the terrorist with a 
bomb are very low. The government also argued that the program 
would deter terrorists from bringing bombs on subway trains, but 
nearly any kind of security measure can arguably produce some de-
gree of deterrence. The key issue, which the court did not analyze, is 
whether the program would lead to deterrence significant enough to 
outweigh the curtailment of civil liberties.  
If courts fail to question the efficacy of security measures, then 
the security interest will prevail nearly all the time. Preventing terror-
ism has an immensely heavy weight, and any given security measure 
will provide a marginal advancement toward that goal. In the defer-
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id at 269.  
 27 Id at 273 (quotation marks omitted).  
 28 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
 29 The court declared: 
We will not peruse, parse, or extrapolate four months’ worth of data in an attempt to divine 
how many checkpoints the City ought to deploy in the exercise of its day-to-day police 
power. Counter-terrorism experts and politically accountable officials have undertaken the 
delicate and esoteric task of deciding how best to marshal their available resources in light 
of the conditions prevailing on any given day. We will not—and may not—second-guess the 
minutiae of their considered decisions. 
Id at 274. 
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ence equation, the math then becomes easy. At this point, it is futile to 
even bother to look at the civil liberties side of the balance. The gov-
ernment side has already won.  
Proponents of deference argue that if courts did not defer, then 
they would be substituting their judgment for that of executive offi-
cials, who have greater expertise in understanding security issues. Spe-
cial expertise in national security, however, is often not necessary for 
balancing security and liberty. Judges and legislators should require 
the experts to persuasively justify the security measures being devel-
oped or used. Of course, in very complex areas of knowledge, such as 
advanced physics, nonexperts may find it difficult to understand the 
concepts and comprehend the terminology. But it is not clear that se-
curity expertise involves such sophisticated knowledge that it would 
be incomprehensible to nonexperts. Moreover, the deference argu-
ment conflates evaluating a particular security measure with creating 
such a measure. The point of judicial review is to subject the judgment 
of government officials to critical scrutiny rather than blindly accept 
their authority. Critical inquiry into factual matters is not the imposi-
tion of the judge’s own judgment for that of the decisionmaker under 
review.30 Instead, it is forcing government officials to explain and jus-
tify their policies.  
Few will quarrel with the principle that courts should not “second 
guess” the decisions of policy experts. But there is a difference be-
tween not “second guessing” and failing to critically evaluate the fac-
tual and empirical evidence justifying the government programs. No-
body will contest the fact that security is a compelling interest. The 
key issue in the balancing is the extent to which the security measure 
furthers the interest in security. As I have argued elsewhere, whenever 
courts defer to the government on the effectiveness of a government 
security measure, they are actually deferring to the government on the 
ultimate question as to whether the measure passes constitutional 
muster.31 Deference by the courts or legislature is an abdication of 
their function. Our constitutional system of government was created 
with three branches, a design structured to establish checks and bal-
ances against abuses of power. Institutional competence arguments 
are often made as if they are ineluctable truths about the nature of 
each governmental branch. But the branches have all evolved consid-
erably throughout history. To the extent a branch lacks resources to 
carry out its function, the answer should not be to diminish the power 
of that branch but to provide it with the necessary tools so it can more 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Solove, 84 Iowa L Rev at 1019 (cited in note 23). 
 31 See id at 958–59, 967–68. 
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effectively carry out its function. Far too often, unfortunately, discus-
sions of institutional competence devolve into broad generalizations 
about each branch and unsubstantiated assertions about the inherent 
superiority of certain branches for making particular determinations.  
It is true, as Posner and Vermeule observe, that historically courts 
have been deferential to the executive during emergencies.32 Propo-
nents of security measures often advance what I will refer to as the 
“pendulum theory”—that in times of crisis, the balance shifts more 
toward security and in times of peace, the balance shifts back toward 
liberty. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that the “laws will 
thus not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat 
different voice.”33 Judge Posner contends that the liberties curtailed 
during times of crisis are often restored during times of peace.34 Def-
erence is inevitable, and we should accept it without being overly con-
cerned, for the pendulum will surely swing back.  
As I argue elsewhere, however, there have been many instances 
throughout US history of needless curtailments of liberty in the name 
of security, such as the Palmer Raids, the Japanese Internment, and 
the McCarthy communist hearings.35 Too often, such curtailments did 
not stem from any real security need but because of the “personal 
agendas and prejudices” of government officials.36 We should not sim-
ply accept these mistakes as inevitable; we should seek to prevent 
them from occurring. Hoping that the pendulum will swing back offers 
little consolation to those whose liberties were infringed or chilled. 
The protection of liberty is most important in times of crisis, when it is 
under the greatest threat. During times of peace, when our judgment 
is not clouded by fear, we are less likely to make unnecessary sacri-
fices of liberty. The threat to liberty is lower in peacetime, and the 
need to protect it is not as dire. The greatest need for safeguarding 
liberty is during times when we least want to protect it.  
B. Assessing the Security Threat 
In order to balance security and liberty, we must assess the secu-
rity interest. This involves evaluating two components—the gravity of 
the security threat and the effectiveness of the security measures to 
address it. It is often merely assumed without question that the secu-
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 32 (cited in note 16). 
 33 William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 225 (Knopf 1998). 
 34 See Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 304 (Harvard 2003).  
 35 See Daniel J. Solove, Melville’s Billy Budd and Security in Times of Crisis, 26 Cardozo L 
Rev 2443, 2457–59 (2005); Michael Sullivan and Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? 
Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 Yale L J 687, 711–13 (2003). 
 36 Sullivan and Solove, 113 Yale L J at 712 (cited in note 35). 
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rity threat from terrorism is one of the gravest dangers we face in the 
modern world. But this assumption might be wrong.  
Assessing the risk of harm from terrorism is very difficult because 
terrorism is such an irregular occurrence and is constantly evolving. If 
we examine the data from previous terrorist attacks, however, the 
threat of terrorism has been severely overstated. For example, many 
people fear being killed in a terrorist attack, but based on statistics 
from terrorism in the United States, the risk of dying from terrorism is 
miniscule. According to political scientist John Mueller,  
[e]ven with the September 11 attacks included in the count . . . 
the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since 
the late 1960s (which is when the State Department began its ac-
counting) is about the same as the number killed over the same 
period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe al-
lergic reactions to peanuts.37 
Add up the eight deadliest terrorist attacks in US history, and 
they amount to fewer than four thousand fatalities.38 In contrast, flu 
and pneumonia deaths are estimated to be around sixty thousand per 
year.39 Another forty thousand die in auto accidents each year.40 Based 
on our experience with terrorism thus far, the risk of dying from ter-
rorism is very low on the relative scale of fatal risks.  
Dramatic events and media attention can cloud a rational as-
sessment of risk. The year 2001 was not just notable for the September 
11 attacks. It was also the summer of the shark bite, when extensive 
media coverage about shark bites led to the perception that such at-
tacks were on the rise. But there were fewer shark attacks in 2001 than 
in 2000 and fewer deaths as well, with only four in 2001 as compared 
to thirteen in 2000.41 And regardless of which year had more deaths, 
the number is so low that an attack is a freak occurrence.  
It is certainly true that our past experience with terrorism might 
not be a good indicator of the future. More treacherous terrorism is 
possible, such as the use of nuclear or biological weapons. This compli-
cates our ability to assess the risk of harm from terrorism. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                           
 37 John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National 
Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them 13 (Free Press 2006). 
 38 See Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain 
World 239 (Copernicus 2003). 
 39 See, for example, Arialdi M. Miniño, Melonie P. Heron, and Betty L. Smith, Deaths: 
Preliminary Data for 2004, 54 Natl Vital Stats Rep 19, 28 table 7 (2006), online at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_19.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
 40 See id.
 
 41 See Jeordan Legon, Survey: “Shark Summer” Bred Fear, Not Facts CNN.com (Mar 14, 
2003), online at http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/science/03/13/shark.study/ (visited Jan 12, 2008). 
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the intentional human conduct involved in terrorism creates a sense of 
outrage and fear that ordinary deaths do not engender. Alleviating 
fear must be taken into account, even if such fear is irrationally high in 
relation to other riskier events such as dying in a car crash. But 
enlightened policy must not completely give in to the panic and irra-
tional fear of the moment. It should certainly attempt to quell the fear, 
but it must do so thoughtfully.  
Nevertheless, most policymakers find it quite difficult to assess 
the threat of terrorism modestly. In the face of widespread public 
panic, it is hard for government officials to make only moderate 
changes. Something dramatic must be done, or political heads will roll. 
Given the difficulty in assessing the security threat in a more rational 
manner, it is imperative that the courts meaningfully analyze the ef-
fectiveness of security measures. Even if panic and fear might lead to 
the gravity of the threat being overstated, we should at least ensure 
that the measures taken to promote security are sufficiently effective 
to justify the cost. Unfortunately, as I will discuss in the next section, 
rarely do discussions about the sacrifice of civil liberties explain the 
corresponding security benefit, why such a benefit cannot be achieved 
in other ways, and why such a security measure is the best and most 
rational one to take.  
C. Assessing the Security Measures 
Little scrutiny is given to security measures. They are often just 
accepted as a given, no matter how ill-conceived or ineffective they 
might be. Some ineffective security measures are largely symbolic, 
such as the New York City subway search program. The searches are 
unlikely to catch or deter terrorists because they involve only a minis-
cule fraction of the millions of daily passengers. Terrorists can just turn 
to other targets or simply attempt the bombing on another day or at 
another train station where searches are not taking place. The vice of 
symbolic security programs is that they result in needless sacrifices of 
liberty and drain resources from other, more effective security meas-
ures. Nevertheless, these programs have a virtue—they can ameliorate 
fear because they are highly visible. Ironically, the subway search pro-
gram’s primary benefit was alleviating people’s fear (which was 
probably too high), albeit in a deceptive manner (as the program did 
not add much in the way of security).  
Data mining represents another kind of security measure, one 
that currently has little proven effectiveness and little symbolic value. 
Data mining programs are often not visible enough to the public to 
quell much fear. Instead, their benefits come primarily from their ac-
tual effectiveness in reducing terrorist threats, which remains highly 
speculative. Thus far, data mining is not very accurate in the behav-
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ioral predictions it makes. For example, there are approximately 1.8 
million airline passengers each day.42 A data mining program to identify 
terrorists with a false positive rate of 1 percent (which would be exceed-
ingly low for such a program) would flag eighteen thousand people as 
false positives. This is quite a large number of innocent people.  
Why is the government so interested in data mining if it remains 
unclear whether it will ever be very accurate or workable? Part of the 
government’s interest in data mining stems from the aggressive mar-
keting efforts of database companies. After September 11, database 
companies met with government officials and made a persuasive pitch 
about the virtues of data mining.43 The technology sounds quite daz-
zling when presented by skillful marketers, and it can work quite well 
in the commercial setting. The problem, however, is that just because 
data mining might be effective for businesses trying to predict cus-
tomer behavior does not make it effective for the government trying 
to predict who will engage in terrorism. A high level of accuracy is not 
necessary when data mining is used by businesses to target marketing 
to consumers, because the cost of error to individuals is minimal. 
Amazon.com, for example, engages in data mining to determine which 
books its customers are likely to find of interest by comparing book-
buying patterns among its customers. Although it is far from precise, it 
need not be because there are few bad consequences if it makes a 
wrong book recommendation. Conversely, the consequences are vastly 
greater for government data mining.  
Ultimately, I do not believe that the case has been made that data 
mining is a wise expenditure of security resources. Those who advo-
cate for security should be just as outraged as those on the liberty side 
of the debate. Although courts should not micromanage which secu-
rity measures the government chooses, they should examine the effec-
tiveness of any given security measure to weigh it against the liberty 
costs. Courts should not tell the executive branch to modify a security 
measure just because they are not convinced it is the best one, but 
they should tell the executive that a particular security measure is not 
effective enough to outweigh the liberty costs. The very point of pro-
tecting liberty is to demand that sacrifices to liberty are not in vain 
and that security interests, which compromise civil liberties, are suffi-
ciently effective to warrant the cost.  
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Fred Bayles, Air-Traveler Screening, Privacy Concerns Collide, USA Today 6A (Oct 
3, 2003).  
 43 See, for example, Robert O’Harrow, Jr., No Place to Hide 56–63 (Free Press 2005) (dis-
cussing the lobbying efforts of Acxiom, a data brokerage company, to convince politicians of data 
mining’s potential value for counterterrorism purposes). 
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D. The Zero-sum Tradeoff Argument 
Those defending the national security side of the balance often 
view security and liberty as a zero-sum tradeoff. Posner and Vermeule 
contend, for example, that “[a]t the security-liberty frontier, any in-
crease in security requires a decrease in liberty.”44 It is not clear, how-
ever, why security and civil liberties must be mutually exclusive. Not 
all security measures compromise liberty. Moreover, there is no estab-
lished correlation between the effectiveness of a security measure and 
a corresponding decrease in liberty. In other words, the most effective 
security measures need not be the most detrimental to liberty.  
Proponents of security characterize rights as bans and restrictions 
on surveillance. For example, in justifying the NSA surveillance pro-
gram, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales stated,  
I cannot help but wonder if [terrorists] are not shaking their 
heads in amazement at the thought that anyone would imperil 
such a sensitive program by leaking its existence in the first place, 
and smiling at the prospect that we might now disclose even 
more or perhaps even unilaterally disarm ourselves of a key tool 
in the war on terror.45 
The balance between security and liberty is often discussed in 
terms of whether a government surveillance program should or should 
not occur. In other words, the tradeoff between security and liberty is 
viewed as all or nothing.  
But this is not how most constitutional and statutory protections 
against surveillance currently work. The Fourth Amendment rarely 
bans surveillance; it requires judicial oversight of such surveillance 
and it mandates that the government justify its measures. Under the 
Fourth Amendment, the government can engage in many searches 
and seizures that are very invasive of privacy so long as the govern-
ment can justify its privacy invasions to a neutral judge or magistrate, 
who will then grant a search warrant. Thus, the cost to security of pro-
tecting liberty need not be the scrapping of an entire security measure, 
but rather, imposing particular kinds of oversight, accountability, and 
minimization. When security measures are balanced against liberty, 
what should be weighed is the marginal increase in effectiveness of the 
security measure from the lack of judicial oversight, minimization, or 
other procedural protection ordinarily imposed to safeguard liberty.  
                                                                                                                           
 44 Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 12 (cited in note 16). 
 45 Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency’s Surveillance Authority, 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong, 2d Sess 10, 15 (2006) (testi-
mony of Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General). 
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Far too often, however, discussions of security and liberty neglect 
to assess the balance this way. Polls frequently pose the question as an 
all-or-nothing tradeoff. A 2002 Pew Research poll asked American 
citizens: “Should the government be allowed to read e-mails and listen 
to phone calls to fight terrorism?”46 A 2005 poll from Rasmussen Re-
ports posed the question: “Should the National Security Agency be 
allowed to intercept telephone conversations between terrorism sus-
pects in other countries and people living in the United States?”47 
Both these questions, however, neglect to account for warrants and 
court orders. Few would contend that the government should not be 
allowed to conduct a wide range of searches when it has a search war-
rant or court order. So the questions should be posed as: Should the 
government be allowed to read emails and listen to phone calls with-
out a search warrant or the appropriate court order required by law to 
fight terrorism? Should the National Security Agency be allowed to 
intercept telephone conversations between terrorism suspects in other 
countries and people living in the United States without a court order or 
judicial oversight? The choice is not between a security measure and 
nothing, but between a security measure with oversight and control and 
a security measure within the sole discretion of executive officials.  
II.  THE LIBERTY INTEREST 
When it comes to the liberty interest in the security-versus-liberty 
balance, a host of problems arise in the balancing. One of the primary 
liberty interests implicated by data mining is privacy, but several pro-
ponents of data mining contend that the privacy interest is not par-
ticularly strong. Even when the problems of data mining are under-
stood in their full dimensions, and although they implicate many con-
stitutional rights, data mining often falls between the crevices of con-
stitutional doctrine.  
The privacy problems with data mining are often defined in nar-
row ways that neglect to account for the full panoply of problems cre-
ated by the practice. As Richard Posner argues:  
The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts 
of personal data is said to invade privacy. But machine collection 
and processing of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of 
their volume, the data are first sifted by computers, which search 
for names, addresses, phone numbers, etc., that may have intelli-
                                                                                                                           
 46 Bob Sullivan, Have You Been Wiretapped? MSNBC.com (Jan 10, 2006), online at http://red-
tape.msnbc.com/2006/01/have_you_been_w.html (visited Jan 12, 2008) (quotation marks omitted). 
 47 National Security Agency, Rasmussen Reports (Dec 28, 2005), online at http://www.ras-
mussenreports.com/2005/NSA.htm (visited Jan 12, 2008).  
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gence value. This initial sifting, far from invading privacy (a com-
puter is not a sentient being), keeps most private data from being 
read by any intelligence officer.48 
The potential harm from data mining, Posner argues, is use of the 
information to blackmail an “administration’s critics and political op-
ponents” or to “ridicule or embarrass.”49 Similarly, William Stuntz con-
tends that the privacy problems are created not by collection but by 
disclosure and use: “The true image of privacy intrusion is not some 
NSA bureaucrat listening in on phone calls, but rather Kenneth Starr’s 
leaky grand jury investigation, which splashed a young woman’s social 
life across America’s newspapers and TV screens.”50  
Posner and Stuntz focus on the problems of disclosure or the 
threat of disclosure (blackmail). Indeed, data mining is often under-
stood as a problem of information dissemination. Elsewhere, however, 
I contend that privacy violations involve a range of different kinds of 
problems.51 Of the four broad categories of problems I identify, at least 
three are implicated in data mining programs: information collection, 
information processing, and information dissemination. Proponents of 
data mining, therefore, must address all of these types of problems, not 
just problems with information dissemination.  
A. Problems with the Collection of Information 
It is certainly true that disclosure and use of information can cre-
ate significant privacy problems. But collection can create problems as 
well. Although the leaks from Kenneth Starr’s investigation were a 
problem, many people were more shocked by the powerful tools used 
by the prosecutor—for example, Starr calling Monica Lewinsky’s 
mother to testify against her and issuing subpoenas to a bookstore for 
Lewinsky’s book purchases. Such information gathering about First 
Amendment activities involving people’s reading habits and speech 
might chill the exercise of such rights.52  
Despite potential problems with the information collection for 
use in data mining, the Fourth Amendment provides little protection 
because of doctrinal limitations. One enormous problem is the third-
party doctrine. In United States v Miller,53 the Supreme Court held that 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Richard A. Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, Wash Post A31 (Dec 21, 2005).  
 49 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact at 97 (cited in note 13).  
 50 Stuntz, Secret Service, New Republic at 15 (cited in note 10).  
 51 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U Pa L Rev 477, 484–89 (2006).  
 52 See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 NYU L Rev 112, 
143–51 (2007) (discussing Supreme Court decisions on chilling effects and the First Amendment, 
and their implications for government information gathering). 
 53 425 US 435 (1976). 
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people lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records 
because “[a]ll of the documents obtained, including financial state-
ments and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily con-
veyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary 
course of business.”54 Employing analogous reasoning in Smith v 
Maryland,55 the Supreme Court held that people lack a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in pen register information (the phone num-
bers they dial) because users “know that they must convey numerical 
information to the phone company,” and therefore they cannot “har-
bor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain 
secret.”56  
Data mining is often a collaborative project between the gov-
ernment and businesses. In the Information Age, countless companies 
maintain detailed records of individuals’ personal information: inter-
net service providers, merchants, bookstores, phone companies, cable 
companies, and many more. The personal data is often gathered by 
businesses, which then supply it to the government. As so much of our 
personal information is in the hands of various companies, the third-
party doctrine severely limits Fourth Amendment protection.  
B. Problems with the Processing of Information 
Some of the most significant problems of data mining involve in-
formation processing—the way that previously gathered information 
is stored, analyzed, and used. The analysis of data to identify people 
who match certain profiles resembles a dragnet search—casting a gi-
ant net to see what it brings in. In many ways, this practice resembles 
general warrants—broad fishing expeditions for criminal activity—
about which the Framers of the Constitution were particularly con-
cerned in drafting the Fourth Amendment. This is why the Fourth 
Amendment imposes a requirement of particularity; the government 
must have particularized suspicion that what it is searching will turn 
up criminal evidence. Although data mining is a form of digital drag-
net search, the Fourth Amendment does not regulate it because the 
searching occurs after the government has obtained the data. Indeed, 
the Fourth Amendment provides few, if any, limitations on the use, 
storage, or retention of data after collection.  
Another potential threat posed by data mining is that it can tar-
get people based on their First Amendment activities. Suspicious pro-
files might involve information about people’s free speech, free asso-
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id at 442. 
 55 442 US 735 (1979). 
 56 Id at 743. 
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ciation, or religious activity. Singling people out for extra investigation, 
for denial of the right to travel by plane, or for inclusion in a suspi-
cious persons blacklist is more troubling if based even in part on pro-
tected First Amendment activities. As I argue elsewhere, I believe that 
there is an argument under existing First Amendment doctrine to 
challenge such practices, although such challenges have not frequently 
been made up to this point.57  
Data mining might also implicate equal protection. A person’s 
race or ethnicity might be used in a profile. To the extent that race or 
ethnicity is a major factor in singling out people as suspicious and de-
serving differential treatment, this might implicate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Some argue, however, that data mining helps to eliminate 
stereotyping and discrimination. As Tal Zarsky contends, data mining 
can minimize the human element, thus preventing bias and racism 
from entering into the process.58 Whereas some data mining tech-
niques involve a human-created profile of a terrorist and seek to iden-
tify people who match the profile, other data mining techniques in-
volve the computer composing the profile by analyzing patterns of 
behavior from known terrorists. Even this latter technique, however, 
involves human judgment—about who qualifies as a terrorist and who 
does not. Profiles can contain pernicious assumptions—hidden in the 
architecture of computer code and embedded in algorithms so that 
they appear to be the decision of neutral computers.  
On the other hand, one might argue, profiling via data mining 
might be better than the alternatives. Frederick Schauer aptly notes 
that there is no escape from profiling, for without data mining, officials 
will be making their own subjective judgments about who is suspi-
cious.59 These judgments are based on an implicit profile, though one 
that is not overt and articulated. “[T]he issue is not about whether to 
use profiles or not but instead about whether to use (or to prefer) 
formal written profiles or informal unwritten ones.”60 Although it is 
true that formal profiles constructed in advance have their virtues 
over ad hoc profiling by officials, formal profiles contain some disad-
vantages. They are more systematic than the ad hoc approach, thus 
compounding the effects of information tied to race, ethnicity, religion, 
speech, or other factors that might be problematic. Those profiling 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Solove, 82 NYU L Rev at 143–44 (cited in note 52). 
 58 See Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the 
Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 Yale J L & Tech 1, 27 (2003). 
 59 See Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 173–74 (Belknap 2003) 
(discussing the tradeoff between profiles constructed in advance and those made on a case-by-
case basis). 
 60 Id at 173. 
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informally are subject to scrutiny, as they have to answer in court 
about why they believed a person was suspicious. Data mining, how-
ever, lacks such transparency, a problem I will discuss later on. Formal 
written profiles cease to have an advantage over informal unwritten 
ones if they remain hidden and unsupervised.  
Data mining also raises due process issues. As Daniel Steinbock 
notes, “[t]he most striking aspect of virtually all antiterrorist data 
matching and data mining decisions is the total absence of even the 
most rudimentary procedures for notice, hearing, or other opportuni-
ties for meaningful participation before, or even after, the deprivation 
[of liberty] is imposed.”61 Will those singled out by data mining pro-
grams be able to raise a challenge? Will people have a right to a hear-
ing? How long will it take for people to get hearings? Will people have 
a right to an attorney? Will people get to correct erroneous data? How?  
Suppose a person disagrees with the profile. Can this be ad-
dressed at the hearing? Likely not, as the profiles are secret. If the 
profiles were revealed to the public, the argument goes, the terrorists 
would be better able to take steps to evade them. But what kind of 
meaningful challenge can people make if they are not told about the 
profile that they supposedly matched? How can we evaluate the pro-
filing systems if we are kept in the dark?  
Predictive determinations about one’s future behavior are much 
more difficult to contest than investigative determinations about one’s 
past behavior. Wrongful investigative determinations can be ad-
dressed in adjudication. But wrongful predictions about whether a 
person might engage in terrorism at some point in the future are often 
not ripe for litigation and review. Nevertheless, people may experience 
negative consequences from such predictive judgments, such as being 
denied the ability to travel or being subject to extra scrutiny.  
C. Transparency 
Another key issue regarding the liberty side of the balance is 
transparency—the degree of openness by which a particular security 
measure is carried out. Transparency is essential to promote account-
ability and to provide the public with a way to ensure that government 
officials are not engaging in abuse. “Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants,” Justice Brandeis declared, “electric light the most effi-
cient policeman.”62 As James Madison stated: “A popular Government, 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 Ga L Rev 1, 82 
(2005). 
 62 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money: And How the Bankers Use It 62 (Natl Home 
Library 1933). 
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without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Pro-
logue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, 
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”63 
Stuntz argues that transparency can be detrimental to effective se-
curity. Transparency, Stuntz contends, makes it harder for government 
officials to respond to security threats: “For most officials most of the 
time, the key choice is not between doing right and doing wrong, but 
between doing something and doing nothing. Doing nothing is usually 
easier—less likely to generate bad headlines or critical blog posts.”64  
Government officials, however, very often try to do something—
the problem is that the “something” they try to do is not the result of 
an informed and thoughtful policy analysis but often a cheap gim-
micky solution that will grab headlines. The choice for officials is not 
between doing something or nothing—it is between doing something 
symbolic versus doing something meaningful but more nuanced and 
complicated. When it comes to security, the symbolic measures often 
have high civil liberty costs with very little security payoff. Left unex-
plored are the many more meaningful alternatives where the benefits 
might outweigh the costs.  
Posner and Vermeule do not contest the value of transparency. In-
stead, they contend that “[g]overnmental decisionmaking is often more 
visible during emergencies than during normal times.”65 But it is not at 
all evident that this is the case. Many of the security measures taken 
by the Bush Administration following September 11 were done under 
the cloak of secrecy. The Administration’s response to leaks about the 
existence of the programs was outrage. Responding to reports that 
revealed that he authorized the NSA to conduct warrantless surveil-
lance within the United States, President Bush criticized the media 
and public officials who provided the information and declared: “As a 
result, our enemies have learned information they should not have. 
And the unauthorized disclosure of this effort damages our national 
security and puts our citizens at risk.”66 
How, exactly, does revealing the fact that Bush authorized the 
NSA to conduct surveillance—possibly exceeding the limits of his law-
ful powers—put “our citizens at risk”? Why is every disclosure about 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug 4, 1822), in Gaillard Hunt, ed, 9 The 
Writings of James Madison 103, 103 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1910). 
 64 Stuntz, Secret Service, New Republic at 14 (cited in note 10). 
 65 Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 55 (cited in note 16). 
 66 Bush on the Patriot Act and Eavesdropping, NY Times A43 (Dec 18, 2005). See also 
Peter Baker, President Says He Ordered NSA Domestic Spying; In Radio Address, He Rebukes 
Democrats for Opposing Renewal of the Patriot Act, Wash Post A1 (Dec 18, 2005). 
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the extent of the government’s surveillance somehow assisting the 
terrorists? Far too often, we trust the government when it claims the 
need for secrecy, but should we? As Mary-Rose Papandrea notes, 
courts are often far too willing to defer to government claims of se-
crecy: “[W]hen information arguably involves national security, courts 
are too timid to force the executive branch to provide a thorough ex-
planation for continued secrecy.”67  
The problem with many data mining programs is that they lack 
adequate transparency. The reason for the secrecy of the programs is 
that exposing the algorithms and patterns that trigger identification as 
a possible future terrorist will tip off terrorists about what behaviors 
to avoid. This is indeed a legitimate concern. Our society, however, is 
one of open government, public accountability, and oversight of gov-
ernment officials—not one of secret blacklists maintained by bureauc-
racies. Without public accountability, unelected bureaucrats can ad-
minister data mining programs in ways often insulated from any scru-
tiny at all. For example, the information gathered about people for use 
in data mining might be collected from sources that do not take suffi-
cient steps to maintain its accuracy. Without oversight, it is unclear 
what level of accuracy the government requires for the information it 
gathers and uses. If profiles are based on race, speech, or other factors 
that society might not find desirable to include, how is this to be aired 
and discussed? If a person is routinely singled out based on a profile 
and wants to challenge the profile, there appears to be no way to do so 
unless the profile is revealed.  
The lack of transparency in data mining programs makes it nearly 
impossible to balance the liberty and security interests. Given the sig-
nificant potential privacy issues and other constitutional concerns, 
combined with speculative and unproven security benefits as well as 
many other alternative means of promoting security, should data min-
ing still be on the table as a viable policy option? Of course, one could 
argue that data mining at least should be investigated and studied. 
There is nothing wrong with doing so, but the cost must be considered 
in light of alternative security measures that might already be effec-
tive and lack as many potential problems. Data mining might prove 
lucrative to various database companies and other government con-
tractors; it might also provide government officials in various govern-
ment agencies with new projects to investigate and explore. But dol-
lars spent for data mining are dollars not spent for other programs.  
                                                                                                                           
 67 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the War on Terror, 
25 BC Third World L J 35, 79 (2005) (arguing that the Freedom of Information Act and the First 
Amendment have proved to be insufficient tools for the public to monitor government counter-
terrorism efforts). 
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CONCLUSION 
The current security-liberty debate is deeply flawed, resulting in a 
balancing between security and liberty that is not very meaningful. 
The scale is rigged so that security will win out nearly all the time. In 
an age of consequentialist balancing of rights against government in-
terests, it is imperative that the balancing be done appropriately. Secu-
rity and liberty often clash, but there need not be a zero-sum tradeoff. 
Liberty interests are generally not achieved by eliminating particular 
security programs but by placing them under oversight, limiting future 
uses of personal data, and ensuring that they are carried out in a bal-
anced and controlled manner. Curtailing ineffective security measures 
is often not just a victory for liberty but for security as well, since bet-
ter alternatives might be pursued.  
The government is currently seduced by data mining. It is not 
clear, however, that data mining is an effective security measure. Its 
lack of transparency serves as a major impediment to any meaningful 
balancing of its security benefits and liberty costs. By exposing secu-
rity interests to sunlight and heeding liberty interests, the government 
could ultimately be more accountable to the people. The result might 
be not only better protection of liberty but also more thoughtful and 
effective security. 
